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Moral Hazard and Frail Benefit Designs
Jeremy Gold
Abstract
This paper uses economic principles to analyze alternative definitions for end-of-period
liabilities under post-employment benefit plans; the candidates, using U.S. nomenclature, are the
vested benefit obligation (VBO), the accumulated benefit obligation (ABO) and the projected
benefit obligation (PBO). In competitive employment markets with rational contracting we are
unable to justify projected costing (PBO-based) for typical pay-related defined benefit plans.
Projected costing misrepresents the economic obligations incurred by shareholders and invites
moral hazard. Employee exposure to moral hazard may be minimized by exit costing (VBObased) which recognizes only those benefits to which an exiting employee is entitled under the
explicit benefit contract. But exit costing may not fully inform shareholders about the obligations
that they have incurred under implicit contracts that extend beyond the plan document. Accrued
costing (represented in the U.S. by the ABO) may better measure shareholders’ economic
commitments. Small differences between the ABO and the VBO may measure a human capital
asset incented by delayed vesting and benefit eligibility. Large differences are a marker for frail
benefit design and potential moral hazard. Moral hazard options exercised by employers
disappoint employees and may lead to unwelcome ex-post results-oriented repairs imposed by
legislators, regulators and courts.

Post-employment Benefits, Economics and Accounting:
Moral Hazard and Frail Benefit Designs
Jeremy Gold
Introduction
This paper uses economic principles to analyze alternative definitions for end-of-period
liabilities under post-employment benefit plans; the candidates, using U.S. nomenclature, are the
vested benefit obligation (VBO), the accumulated benefit obligation (ABO) and the projected
benefit obligation (PBO). We are concerned only with economics and financial reporting and do
not address funding.
Each of the end-of-period liability recognition scheme implies an allocation of costs over
periods of employment. Because the VBO adheres to the explicit “contract” that defines the
benefit entitlement of an exiting employee, we may call the VBO-based allocation exit costing.
Accrued costing is based on the ABO which exceeds the VBO because it assigns probabilities to
future service that may meet eligibility requirements for vesting and for subsidized benefits. The
ABO recognizes an implicit contract to continue employment beyond the current reporting date.
Projected costing is based on the PBO which adds a second layer of implicit contract,
recognizing the benefit impact of estimated future pay increases.
The end-of-period liabilities must properly inform shareholders with respect to economic
obligations that they have incurred. The cost allocation method should provide reliable
information to support economically rational decisions by managers, employees, investors and
regulators.
Fully vested defined contribution (DC) plans provide an example of exit costing. The cost
recognized by the employer in each period is identical to the cash it contributes. Defined benefit
(DB) and other post-employment benefit plans accrue over an employee’s career in ways that

makes the cost attribution less certain. Difficulties can arise with provisions for vesting and
benefit eligibility and with the treatment of future salary increases under pay-related DB plans.
When do benefits that are subject to vesting and eligibility rules accrue, over the full crediting
period or only when they vest? Do final-pay benefits accrue on the basis of current pay or
expected final pay? What about benefits that may be revoked at the company’s discretion, such
as retiree medical coverage or ancillary pension benefits that are not protected by statute?
We assume competitive markets for labor and capital, and rational contracts. These
contracts may be explicit, implicit or both and may include risks. Under these conditions, we
argue that there cannot be a rational implicit contract for future pay increases that induces
noncompetitive total compensation. This means we can rule out projected costing for common
pay-related DB plans. But U.S. and international accounting standards prescribe exactly that
approach. This accounting for benefit costs over employees’ careers is flawed because it
misrepresents the underlying contracts and invites moral hazard.
Some plan designs deliberately delay vesting and eligibility, leading to an ABO that is
greater than the VBO. Such designs put employees at risk, raise expected compensation, reduce
turnover, enable training investments and enhance productivity. Small differences may mark
tradeoffs where productivity gains exceed expected compensation increases; thus the difference
represents a human capital asset. Large differences, however, indicate frail contracts where the
increased compensation required for employee risks is very likely to exceed any productivity
gains; the difference exceeds any human capital asset and reflects an opportunity for moral
hazard.
In Section 2, we review principles of employment economics and provide a literature
review.
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In Section 3, we define and develop the cost method candidates and explore them in spot
markets and under explicit and implicit contracts. We see that projected costing requires the
support of an enforceable multiperiod contract.
In Section 4, we examine the difference between the ABO and the VBO and the
implications for robust rational plan design.
In Section 5, we look at historical cases where the enforcement mechanisms for implicit
contracts have broken down and the moral hazard option has been exercised. We then look at
how society responds to such action. Regulators, legislators and courts respond in ways that may
disappoint employers and employees and threaten the future of otherwise desirable employee
benefit schemes. Section 6 summarizes the paper and concludes.
2.

Some Principles of Employment Economics
We seek an economic basis to inform financial reporting for firms that sponsor post-

employment benefit plans. We do so in the context of employment economics and contractual
relationships.
2.1

Contract Basics
Contracts constitute an important branch of economic analysis. We are interested in

contracts related to employment and the recognition of the liabilities to which they give rise.
Contracts are agreements entered into by willing parties, each for its own perceived
benefit. Although some contracts begin and end immediately (e.g., a cash purchase of a
newspaper), we are interested here in contracts that may extend over long periods. Because
circumstances change subsequent to the original meeting of the minds,1 contracts must have
force even after one party would rather no longer be bound. Thus, contracts must be part of a
system that can coerce compliance from a reluctant party. Usually, the reputations of the parties
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or their continued interdependence, serve as the enforcement mechanism. Occasionally, courts
must intervene and apply legal sanctions.
Contracts may be explicit or implicit or combinations of both. Economics teaches us that
it is efficient to formalize a contract in writing when the benefits of such formality exceed the
preparation costs. When a home is sold, it is efficient to write a contract because the amount of
value being transferred is large, the sale occurs at a single point in time, there are only a few
pertinent issues, the importance of compliance is high and both parties want the enforcement
potential of the courts to stand behind the transaction. In contrast, when a firm hires a young
manager or salaried professional, an explicit contract is not efficient because the employment
relationship will encompass changing responsibilities and compensation, evolving relationshipspecific investments by each party, and an unpredictable date of severance. Thus the typical nonexecutive employment contract will consist of mutual and tacit understandings, backed by a
commonality of interests.
Economists expect contracts to be rational (the welfare of each party is improved) and
efficient (no “better” contract exists).2
Contracts may incorporate options (financial or real) that may be absolute or conditional.
Examples from the employment world may include the right to terminate a pension plan at any
time for any reason, the right to fire an employee for inadequate performance or the right to
choose a lump sum rather than an annuity. The holder of the right (the “long” position) will
usually have had to concede some compensation to the “short” party in the contract negotiation.
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2.2

Financial Accounting for Contracts
Principle 1: The objective of financial accounting is to report value-relevant information

to interested parties. Information that would reduce (increase) the price that a buyer would be
willing to pay for a share of the firm signifies a value-relevant liability (asset).
Principle 2: Accounting recognition follows de facto contracts whether implicit, explicit
or combined. This is a direct application of Principle 1. Financial accounting reports the value of
firm assets and the value of contractual claims against those assets in a fashion that will be
credible to suppliers of capital and labor. Although this may seem to be self-evident, we will see
that much of the debate about the proper accounting for employee benefits turns on the nature of
the contracts and upon the actions and intents of the parties.
2.3

Risks and Incentives in Employment Contracts
We consider the impact of three distinct types of employment-related risks faced by

employees: (a) statistical (or demographic) risk, where individual employee experiences vary
around actuarial expectations in regard to tenure, compensation, mortality etc., (b) firm-specific
risk, where employees are exposed to the fortunes of the firm and (c) moral hazard, where
employees are vulnerable to exploitation if management fails to adhere faithfully to implicit
contracts.
Contracts that impose risk on employees stimulate risk-averse employees to demand
higher expected total compensation. Statistical and firm-specific risks may motivate greater
productivity:
•

Firm-specific risk aligns employee compensation and firm results. This may be accomplished
through bonus programs, stock options and grants, and promises without collateral (e.g.,
unfunded or underfunded benefit programs that make the employee a de facto firm creditor).
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•

Statistical risk, such as a probability of future vesting instead of immediate vesting, can serve
to retain and motivate employees. Employees facing potential forfeiture if they terminate will
(a) require greater pay from competitors seeking to hire them away and (b) be disinclined to
shirk for fear of being fired.
The amount of compensation demanded per unit of risk increases as a function of the

amount of risk employees are asked to bear. An employee who demands a $1 risk premium for
one unit of risk will demand more than a $2 premium for two units. The incentive effect declines
as risk is increased. If the first unit of imposed risk adds $10 to output, the second unit will add
less than another $10.
Principle 3: Increasing employment contract risk may be efficient, but only up to a limit.
At some point, the increasing marginal compensation must exceed the decreasing marginal
productivity, and any further imposition of risk must be counterproductive.
Principle 4: Exposing employees to moral hazard is generally inefficient. An employer
who wants to retain valuable options against employee interests cannot generally pay employees
enough. This is tantamount to asking employees to insure the employer against its own bad acts.
Most actuaries will deem this risk “uninsurable.” A more practicable variation on this theme may
be constructed with conditions; that is, the option to renege on promised benefits will only be
exercised when condition “A” occurs. If A is defined, for example, in terms of the employer’s
financial distress, we may characterize the employee position as “short a customized put on the
employer’s equity.” Such a short position equals a variable long position in the employer equity.
Thus, we have a special case of firm-specific risk.
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2.4

Competition
Under a simple competitive equilibrium model, firms employ capital and labor, each of

which is provided within a context of perfect information, competition and mobility. This model
includes spot markets for capital and labor, the existence of which implies that:
•

The risk-adjusted expected return on capital is the same in every firm. Lower (higher)
returns cause a departure (influx) of capital until this principle is met.

•

Each employee will be offered the same total compensation in each period by numerous
firms. Lower (higher) total compensation causes a departure (influx) of labor until this
principle is met.
Principle 5: Total compensation is independent of the value of benefits earned under the

de facto contract. Any increase in benefits must be offset dollar-for-dollar by a decrease in direct
pay. If a firm chose to commit more (or less) to benefits without adjusting direct pay, the
resulting increase (decrease) in total compensation would drive away its suppliers of capital
(labor).
In the sections that follow, the simple model will be made more complex to account for
the real-life features of explicit and implicit contracts of employment. We begin by using the
simple model to develop exit-cost recognition of plan liabilities and costs.
2.5

Economic Models of Implicit Pension Contracts
Actuaries, accountants and economists have struggled to assign value to financial

promises that are wrapped in complicated relationships where not everything is reduced to
written contracts. It appears that, while we all may model what we see, we cannot be sure that we
have grasped the financial essence of the unwritten promise and its intended effects. Actuaries
use statistical models to predict distributions of outcomes under implicit contracts; accountants
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concentrate on the timing of transfers of value; economists are concerned about the rationality of
contracts.
2.5.1 Lazear Style Implicit Contracts (LSICs)
Lazear (1979) identifies implicit multiperiod employment contracts that add value for
employers and employees. Lazear (1983) asserts that DB pension plans may be viewed as the
implementation mechanism for LSICs. According to Lazear, early in their careers, certain
employees are paid less than their competitive total compensation. These employees, who tacitly
agree to participate in LSICs, commit to a long-term relationship that withholds a portion of their
earned total compensation, trains them to enhance their future productivity, motivates them to
perform under the risk of losing the value withheld, and ultimately rewards them with career
total pay that reflects their enhanced productivity. Usually such employees may be characterized
as salaried non-bargaining employees covered by pay-related DB pension plans.
The portion of early-career compensation that is withheld is deemed to act as a “training
bond” that allows employers to invest in the employee relationship or as a “performance bond”
that discourages employee shirking.3 Return of the withheld compensation late in the career (in
the form of vested early retirement subsidies and post-employment benefits) acts as a severance
incentive.
Employees who participate in LSICs must believe that, even after considering various
risksincluding possible reneging by the firmthey will be adequately rewarded. This belief
has been bolstered by the observation that the firm has not reneged on prior generations of
employees. Firms that see the value in LSICs need to protect their access to today’s young work
force by honoring the implied promises previously made to their employees with long-tenure
today.
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Can Lazear style implicit contracts justify accounting that recognizes pension liabilities
in excess of those in explicit plan documents? How real are the promises and how precisely can
they be measured?
2.5.2

Implicit Contracts and DB Pension Plans
Kotlikoff and Wise (1985) examine the empirical evidence to see whether labor markets

follow a spot or a multiperiod contractual model. They focus on cliff vesting and cliff eligibility
for subsidized early retirement benefits. Under the spot approach, the presumed smoothness of
total compensation must be offset by sharply discontinuous vested values particularly at, and
shortly after, age 55; observable direct pay should not proceed smoothly upward in that age
range. Kotlikoff and Wise do not find such discontinuity in direct pay and deduce that implicit
contracts prevail over the spot market model.
Bodie (1985) in his comment in re Kotlikoff and Wise (1985) questions how much can be
deduced about implicit contracts by looking at direct pay patterns without having substantially
more information about other forces at work.
Bulow and Landsman (1985) note that the direct pay patterns of individual employees
may not reflect the impact of discontinuous benefit entitlements. Because benefit decisions and
salary determinations are often made disjointly within an employer’s hierarchy, we often observe
employees who earn the same direct pay but take unequal advantage of offered benefits.
Nonetheless, because the employer must still determine its total compensation competitively,
cohort direct pay plus cohort vested benefit costs must equal cohort total compensation, even if
the rule applies imperfectly for individuals.
Bulow (1982) asks the critical question, “[h]ow should the firm accrue its pension
liability to the worker over time, to keep accounting profits consistent with economic profits?”
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(p. 438) if an implicit career-long contract exists. Bulow argues that the total compensation
should be recognized in each period, regardless of how it is apportioned between direct pay and
pension benefits. If the employer recognizes the PBO, the employee’s direct pay equals total
compensation ( TC ) less the service cost ( SC ). Even though the employee’s direct pay plus the
value of his incremental vested benefits ( VC ) does not equal the total compensation earned, the
employee does not care because the employer is fully obligated for the PBO under the long-term
contract. This relationship is outlined algebraically in Section 3.
Noting the analogy between pensions and life insurance that drives actuarial cost
methods, Bulow reinforces this observation. He states that the whole life policyholder does not
object to paying more than the term cost in early years because the insurer is obliged to offer
coverage below the term cost in later years. The burden is on those who advocate projected
benefit accounting for pensions to show that there exists an implicit contract of sufficient force to
assure the employee cohort that it will be made whole.
Finally, Bulow (1982) argues that, even if LSICs exist, there is no reason to assume that
“the value of the firm’s implicit contract liability is systematically related to the difference
between the present values of its pension liabilities, as calculated under the projected benefit and
accrued benefit methods” (p. 440). In other words, the pattern of the implicit obligation created
by the use of the PBO rather than the VBO would have to be justified. “The point here is that an
extraordinary set of implicit contracts is necessary, but not sufficient, for projected benefit
methods to be appropriate … ” (p. 440).
We can see a divide between Bulow (1982) and Lazear (1983) that is not well-resolved
by empirical work nor by further debate in the years that followed. The FASB adopted a
projected measure for statements of profit and loss and an asymmetric accrued measure for the

10

balance sheet in FAS 87 effective for fiscal years beginning after Dec. 15, 1986.4 The debate
among economists subsided after the flurry of work in the 1980’s while practitioners proceeded
to implement the FAS 87 methodology.
More recently we have seen dissatisfaction with financial reporting under FAS 87, a
continuation of a trend to a more mobile work force (i.e., more of a spot than a career-long
contract market for labor) and many conversions of traditional pay-related DB plans to cash
balance plans. These factors have contributed to the present revival (and extension) of the 1980’s
debate.
Balan (2003) argues that workplace changes since the early 1980’s have led employers to
reduce their interest in implementing LSICs with their entering employees. No longer
constrained by the impact on the new entrants, employers have been freed from the need to make
good on their existing obligations to their long-tenure employees. Balan’s work is tentative but
indicative of a declining role for LSICs.
3.

Accounting without and with Multiperiod Contracts
In this section we formalize the accounting model for the spot labor marketwhere there

are no implicit contracts and employment agreements are freshly made in each accounting
period. In this case, failure to use period-by-period exit costing can injure employees and
employers. We then consider the case with multiperiod contracts where the periodic accounting
may be relaxed, but injury can still result unless exit costing is applied at the end of the contract.
3.1

Exit-costing for the Spot Market
Consider a simplified model of an economy in competitive equilibrium with full labor

mobility:
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•

Each employee is able to choose each year among several companies, each of which
offers the same total compensation. Job changes carry no legal repercussions,
reputational costs or economic losses to companies or employees.

•

Total compensation ( TCt ) is competitively determined for each employee at the
beginning of each year and is due at the end of the year ( t ). Notation is summarized in
Appendix A.

•

Benefit programs vary from employer to employer but offer no tax advantages.
Employees have no individual benefit preferences and value an employer-provided
benefit dollar equally with a dollar of direct compensation. At least one company, which
we will call Company A, has no benefits and pays each employee’s total compensation as
direct pay.

•

Direct pay ( Wt ) is defined for each employee as the cash compensation paid. The noncash compensation is the end-of-year value of the employee’s incremental vested benefits
( VCt ). In accordance with Principle 5, direct pay due at the end of the year is:
Wt = TCt − VCt .

•

Regulation is nonexistent.
We define the “exit benefit” ( Vt ) as the benefit to which the employee would be entitled

if he left service at year end. It reflects years of service and pay to date; it excludes nonvested
benefits, benefits for which eligibility has not yet been satisfied, and salary scale effects. We
define the end-of-year value of Vt as Lt (Vt ) , or as Lt when the meaning is clear. We designate
the increase during the year of the employee’s exit benefit as ∆Vt . Under these conditions, the
correct benefit cost would be the end-of-year value, Lt (∆Vt ) , which we have already denoted by
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VCt . We refer to the use of Lt on the balance sheet and VCt in the income statement as the “exit-

cost” attribution method.
We count only the exit benefit because any higher or lower cost attribution exposes either
the company or the employee to future loss:
•

Advance recognition: Suppose the company charges more than the exit cost and the
employee goes along. The employee would be foregoing wages not for an immediate
entitlement, but in the expectation that the company will, in a future year, credit benefits
without simultaneously withholding wages. But the company could take the low road,
frustrating the employee’s expectations either by a prospective change in the plan or by
charging fully for the exit benefits when they actually vest.

•

Delayed recognition: Alternatively, suppose the company charges less than the full exit
cost. Companies often increase vested benefits (e.g., career average updates, past service
benefit improvements, negotiated increases in a flat dollar plan etc.) in the belief that
today’s employees will render future service in return (Byrne et al. 1983).5 This belief
may be reflected in the amortization of the instantaneous rise in vested liabilities over
forward periods. When the company tries to recoup its undercharge, the employee quits
while ahead and joins Company A.

3.1.1

Base CaseDefined Contribution Plan
Consider how existing accounting practice treats the following situations:

•

Company A pays a certain employee $50,000 in direct pay with no benefits.

•

Company B pays $48,000 of wages plus $2,000 immediately vested in a DC plan.
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•

Company C, a start-up, puts in a DC plan that credits and immediately vests $1,000 for
an employee with less than five years of service and $3,000 for one with five years or
more.
Under existing practice, which is identical to what we have defined as exit costing,

Company C recognizes $1,000 of benefit cost and pays $49,000 of wages. After five years,
Company C recognizes benefit cost of $3,000 and pays wages of $47,000.
Consider how Company C might apply projected costing. The company recognizes a
uniform cost of $2,000, based on a projection of its average contribution over the employee’s
career; accordingly, it offers $48,000 of wages and reports total compensation expense of
$50,000. This departs from current DC accounting rules, but is there any substantive problem
with it?
An employee who expects to stay with the same company for his entire career decides
that this basis will be favorable and joins Company C. For five years the employee collects total
compensation of $49,000, $48,000 as wages and $1,000 as defined contributions. In the fifth
year, Company C is acquired by Company D. At first, the employee worries that the plan will be
changed. He is reassured to learn that Company D, which has the same DC plan as Company C,
will maintain the plan.
Then the employee learns that Company D uses standard exit costing. His direct wages
will be calculated as $50,000 minus the defined contribution. Over the past five years, the
employee has received the same wages but $5,000 less in defined contributions than his
Company B counterparts. He had expected to recoup this shortfall by continuing to receive the
same wages as Company B employees but getting $1,000 more in annual defined contributions.
Now he realizes that his $5,000 sacrifice was fruitless. Going forward, he will receive the same
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total compensation as they, although differently allocated between wages and defined
contributions. In no real sense did Company C have any liability to meet his expectations of
receiving above-market compensation after five years of service; the “liability” has vanished
without a change in the benefit plan.
This illustrates why the standard accounting in this case, in which it coincides with exit
costing, is correct. Company C’s spreading method creates a phantom liability and can produce
incorrect and abusive compensation decisions.
3.1.2

Salary ScaleAnother Case of Advance Recognition
We next show that the standard accounting for defined benefit (DB) plans is as flawed as

the smoothed DC example above, exactly because it does not follow exit costing. A case that
closely parallels the earlier example can be built using the PBO defined by Financial Accounting
Standard (FAS) 87 (FASB 1985) as applied to a simplified final-pay DB plan.
Unlike the ABO and the VBO,6 the PBO assumes future pay increases. Consider a plan
with immediate vesting that provides a lump sum benefit equal to 2 percent of final year’s total
compensation7 multiplied by years of service. We look at a newly hired employee who might be
expected to work for 30 years. Her initial total compensation is $50,000 and is expected to
compound at 4.9% annually to $200,000 in her 30th year.
The benefit payable after 30 years can be computed as 2 percent of $200,000 ($4,000)
times 30, or $120,000. Because the VBO and PBO calculations each discount for the time value
of money and for termination probabilities in the same way, we ignore these discounts8 and focus
on the different ways in which they assign benefit accruals to reporting periods. The standard
accounting model assigns a service benefit ( ∆Pt ) of $4,000 to each period. The VBO approach,
following the exit-costing theme, computes the first year benefit ( V1 ) as 2 percent of $50,000, or
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$1,000. The two-year vested benefit ( V2 ) is $2,0989 and, thus, the second year accrual ( ∆V2 )
equals $1,098. In the 30th year, when ∆P30 is again $4,000, ∆V30 is $9,415. Each method assigns
a total of $120,000 over 30 years.
The effect of the standard accounting is, parallel to the earlier smoothed-DC example, to
substitute an average cost that exceeds the actual cost in the early years. In this example, the
crossover point occurs after 17 years, at which time the projected P17 is $68,000 while the vested
V17 is only $36,528. Following our earlier example, the employee who has worked for one year

will receive a $46,000 paycheck under standard accounting despite having earned a vested
benefit of only $1,000. Under exit-cost accounting that paycheck is $49,000. As earlier, advancerecognition accounting invites exploitation. If the employer chooses to exploit the situation after
17 years, the employee loses $31,472.
3.1.3

Nonvested and Revocable Benefits
A similar problem arises under current accounting for nonvested benefits. Suppose the

company withholds wages to pay for nonvested benefits (of any kind); the employee accepts this
withholding in the expectation of future vesting. When the vesting year arrives, even if the
company cannot legally change the vesting provision, it can frustrate the employee’s expectation
by changing the ground rules and charging the employee’s direct pay for the full value of the
newly vested pension. The employee would have no recourse. Whether she stays or leaves, she
has received no value for the previous years of pension charges against her pay.
This reasoning applies to all benefits that increase in value as the employee ages: for
normal or ancillary benefits that vest at later ages, for the impact of future pay increases on prior
service, for other post-employment benefits (OPEBs), such as retiree medical plans that vest at
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an early retirement age (e.g., 55), or for benefits that can be revoked by the company. Only exit
costing creates a compensation environment that minimizes opportunities for gaming the system.
3.2

Multiperiod Contracting
When a multiperiod contract exists, the year-by-year precision of the exit-cost model may

be relaxed without introducing moral hazard. Reduction of total compensation early in
employees’ careers is in fact standard in certain businesses where the possibility of future
rewards is part of a conditional implicit contract. Law firms and investment banking firms may
underpay associates by offering the prospect of eventual partnership rewards for the most
successful. The pay pattern is built into the industry structure, and firms intending to stay in
business cannot cheat on the eventual rewards.
This example illustrates that a contract may allow the exit-cost attribution method to be
postponed during the contract period. It does not free us from the need to strike an economically
motivated deal at contract inception nor does it free us from the need to true up at contract
expiry. Our new partners must now be paid commensurately with competitive partnership
standards and our new non-partners must receive future compensation competitive with their
now well-defined status.
This illustration suggests conditions that could permit a company to attribute costs and
withhold wages on a basis other than exit costing. Such conditions would reflect restricted labor
mobility, because of constraints on the company or the employees. These constraints can take the
form of company-employee contracts, explicit or implicit; enforced on the company by the high
costs of recruiting, training and potential reputational injury and lawsuits; enforced on the
employee by high transactions costs associated with job search, job change and the abandonment
of employer-specific skills.
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When a T -year contract exists, the employer and the employee can agree to recognize an
accumulated obligation, Rt , in addition to the vested benefit obligation, Lt . Use of Rt as a
contract reserve (and ∆Rt as the periodic addition to or subtraction from the contract reserve)
allows the direct pay to be overcharged in some years and undercharged in other years, as long as
the accumulated value is zero at the end of the contract:
Liability at the end of year t :

Lt + Rt

Wt = TCt − VCt − ∆Rt

Year t direct pay:

RT = 0 ,

End of contract:

where ∆Rt = Rt − (1 + i ) Rt −1 and i represents a fair employer-employee rate of interest.
3.3

Projected vs. Accrued Costing for DB Plans
FAS 87 assumes a multiperiod contract in the definition of the PBO that, for pay-related

plans, credits a percentage of future earnings in each year’s pension cost. Setting Rt = PBOt − Lt
to reflect the FASB-hypothesized contract in excess of the plan document contract:
Liability at the end of year t :
Year t direct pay:
End of contract:

Lt + Rt = PBOt

Wt = TCt − VCt − ∆Rt = TCt − SCt

VBOT = PBOT ⇒ RT = 0 ,

where VCt + ∆Rt = Lt − (1 + i ) Lt −1 + Rt − (1 + i ) Rt −1 = PBOt − (1 + i ) PBOt −1 = SCt is the FAS 87 service
cost.

Lt represents the exit liability (the VBOt in FAS 87) under the explicit contract defined
by the plan. Thus, Rt represents the advance recognition inherent in the implicit contract that
FAS 87 recognizes. It is appropriate, therefore, to refer to this use of Rt as the FAS 87 implicit
contract reserve.
Is this multi-year implicit contract sufficient to justify the FAS 87 accounting treatment
rather than the exit-cost method? Note that we have had to assume a promise to pay competitive
total compensation over the life of the contract. Further, although this contract does not
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contemplate exit, if we wished to let employees go without penalizing them, we would have to
pay them the implicit contract reserve when they leave. Similarly, the contract does not
anticipate plan termination or amendment but, if we wished to let the plan be amended or
terminated at the will of the employer, we would have to agree to settle up based on the PBO at
that time.
Note that moral hazard is avoided whenever the accounting matches the contract; current
explicit contracts (plan documents) are VBO-like and imply exit costing; an enforceable PBO
contract would be consistent with FAS 87.
3.4 Eliminating Projected Costing as a Candidate
Figure 1 (based on Appendix B) illustrates the difference between exit costing and
projected costing when the entire difference is attributable to anticipation of future pay increases
(i.e., exit costing equals accrued costing in this instance). The area between the ABO and PBO
curves represents the FAS 87 implicit contract reserve. As we have just seen, we need to assume
that an effective multiperiod contract exists in order to avoid exposing employees to the potential
moral hazard measured by this area.
But the potential for moral hazard may not be sufficient cause to eliminate projected
costing as a viable candidate. We must also show that the information provided is not required to
inform shareholders with respect to economic liabilities they have incurred. Can we argue that
the PBO contains economically relevant information? We know that future pay increases will
occur and that we can make reasonable estimates of such increases for employee cohorts. We
suspect that shareholders might find such estimates “interesting.” Nonetheless, nowhere other
than in defined benefit accounting do we find any liabilities or costs associated with future pay
increases. Why?
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Recall that accounting liabilities must be value-relevant and that we expect liabilities on
today’s books to reflect economic obligations incurred to date by shareholders. If shareholders
were committed to provide pay increases under a multi-year contract in such a way as to provide
total compensation that was in excess of competitive rates, we might well agree that an economic
obligation has already been incurred and that it is appropriate to recognize it. But, if the only
obligation that shareholders have made to their employees is to continue to pay them
competitively, no such economic liability has been incurred. Thus future pay increases do not
appear in financial statements.
Consider how a final-pay DB plan might create a current obligation related to future pay
increases. On its face, the plan provides benefits equal to a percentage of final pay for each year
of current service, suggesting that future pay increases should be recognized in current service
cost. But the plan does not commit the employer to the pay increases themselves. The employer
who offers employees a final-pay plan has not agreed to make itself competitively nonviable
compared to the employer who offers another form of compensation. Principle 5 indicates that
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differential benefit costs between competing firms will be offset in direct pay. Employees
covered by a final-pay plan must expect smaller increases in direct pay than those covered by
less expensive plans. Employers who have committed to pay competitive total compensation
have not incurred current economic obligations for their shareholders merely because they offer
some compensation in the form of a DB plan. The current recognition of an obligation for
benefits based on future pay increases is no more justified than the current recognition of future
pay increases themselves.
3.4.1 How Did Projected Costing Become the Standard?
Actuaries developed two cost methods in order to help employers budget their cash
contributions to pension plans. The accrued cost method, analogous to the term insurance policy
referred to by Bulow (1982), recognizes the increase in pension wealth held by a fully vested
employee in each year. As the employee ages, the annual cost rises, as it does for term insurance.
Just as many individual insurance buyers preferred to purchase whole-life insurance in order to
make their insurance outlays more level over their lives, many employers preferred a more level
budget even if early outlays were thereby greater.
At a time when pension benefits were considered “fringes” and costs and liabilities were
less significant to the enterprise than they are today, accountants found it convenient to look to
the cash contributions made as sufficiently reflective of the cost of the plan. When FAS 87 was
being developed during the 1980’s, the FASB was anxious to create more rigor and
comparability between firms and this led them to choose one method. They chose a variation of
an actuarial method known as “projected unit credit” which reflected future pay increases,
vesting and eligibilities.
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FAS 87 was a hybrid that did not quite follow any of the existing actuarial cost methods.
It moved from the actuarial budgeting methods towards (but not to) a market based approach. It
was controversial, compromised, and immediately criticized from numerous directions. In the
intervening years, the accounting profession has been informed by financial economics and by
market forces and is in the process of shifting from an historical cost paradigm to one based on
fair value. It may be said that FAS 87 and its international sisters are artifacts that reflect neither
modern economics nor the accounting trend towards modern economics.
3.4.2

One More Nail
In addition to imposing potential moral hazard and misinforming shareholders, projected

costing threatens the existence of defined benefit plans. The FAS 87 implicit contract reserve
(Figure 1) may be thought of as an employee-shareholder wedge to the extent that employee
pension wealth tracks the accrued benefit line while shareholder obligations seem to track the
projected benefit line. This wedge represents “suspended economic value” not yet realized by
employees and seemingly beyond the reach of shareholders—an asset without an owner.
Figure 2 illustrates how costs are charged (PBO) and value received (ABO) as cohorts of
employees age. This picture implies that older employees will try to hang on to the projectedcost model and the implicit contract that it represents. Younger employees are likely not to
appreciate the DB plan promises when they see their compensation being PBO-charged and their
wealth being ABO-incremented. It has been suggested that “one reason some firms may perceive
DB plans to be increasingly expensive is that employees who place little value on the PBO
promise are not in fact accepting reduced pay.” 10 Employers who observe the relative
preferences of their younger and older employees may conclude that DB plans encourage older
employees to linger past their most productive years while discouraging younger recruits.
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Projected Cost

Justifying Benefit DesignABO:VBO Discrepancies Point to Frail Designs
In this section, we examine benefit designs where the ABO is substantially greater than

the VBO. These designs may or may not be justified economically. We identify a need to inform
shareholders about implicit benefit obligations. This shareholder need for information conflicts
with the protection employees need against being charged for promises that they cannot take
with them. Certain designs are shown to be frail; more robust replacements are outlined.
Section 3 demonstrated that employees whose pay is charged for projected benefits are
vulnerable because the “liabilities” can disappear. Employers can offer smaller pay increases to
employees with longer service in a final-pay plan and employees cannot use competitive offers
to recoup the contract reserve. (The employer can charge an employee for the projected cost
prior to the crossover point in Figure 2 and for the accrued cost thereafter.) It is not so easy,
however, for an employer to take advantage of vesting and eligibility provisions where the
employee can recover the accrued-contract reserve (the ABO minus the VBO) simply by staying
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on the job. We can address the pay issue simply by abandoning the PBO measure in favor of the
VBO or the ABO. But is it perfectly clear which of the latter two is always most appropriate?
The difference between the ABO and the VBO exists because not all benefits accrued by
an employee may be taken on exit. The discussion leading to Principle 3 makes it clear that such
designs are meant to put employee compensation at risk in ways that increase net productivity.
Principle 3, however, cautions us that such incentives have limits. When accrued liabilities are
much larger than vested liabilities, we should ask whether the risk built into the benefit design
will cost more than it returns.
4.1

Explicit and Implicit Benefit Plans
Benefit plan documents expressly deny tenure, for example, “This Summary Plan

Description does not constitute a contract of employment.” Nonvested accrued liabilities come
from implicit contracts and the need to inform shareholders about all value-affecting obligations
whether or not explicit. Strict VBO reporting protects employees. Does it properly inform
shareholders? Under VBO reporting, it appears that the promise to vest a valuable benefit soon is
indistinguishable from no promise at all. Is this a faithful representation of firm value?
In a strict sense, yes, because employees have not been charged for the promise and
because they will be fully charged when the promise vests. Can this be applied in practice? If
VBO reporting is used to account for a post-employment medical plan with cliff vesting, the
paycheck for a newly vested employee must be debited for the entire lump-sum benefit value, an
untenable amount. Without some form of multiperiod contracting, VBO reporting and cliff
vesting cannot be reconciled. Employees at some point in their careerssay, 10 years prior to
the cliff vesting pointmust understand that the employer will vest a substantial fraction of their
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cohort. Rather than pay for this valuable benefit in the vesting year, these employees tacitly
agree to allow the employer, in exchange for the benefit, to pay them less than their market
competitive salaries for the period of years that extends until, and perhaps even after, vesting.
Thus, an implicit pay-smoothing contract exists. If strict VBO reporting were used in this
instance, shareholders would be unaware that liabilities loom for soon-to-be-vested benefits.
This example shows that financial reports must include the value of obligations under a
multiperiod contract, albeit conditional and statistical (i.e., only employees who actually remain
in service will earn any part of the benefit). Competitive total compensation must be reported in
each period and money withheld under an implicit multiperiod contract must be reserved. This
presumes, of course, that the employer will honor the implicit contract.
4.2

Frail Benefit Designs
But what are the terms of the implicit contract? When, if ever, may the employer curtail

promised benefits (or otherwise appropriate the contract reserves)? When the firm is in financial
distress? When managers are in danger of failing to meet their own goals? The contract, because
it does not vest the benefit as it is recognized, creates a valuable employer option. Section 2.3
makes it clear that employees will demand higher pay because they are placed at risk. But when
is this transaction fair and when is it exploitive? At a minimum, a fair contract must be perceived
identically and accurately by the parties. The employees cannot be led to believe that the
employer will renege only under condition “A”, later to learnto their misfortune and
miserythat the employer reneges under condition “B”.
Either details of the contract must be made explicit or employees must have reason to
trust that the employer will be fair. Such a degree of trust applies only in situations where the
value of the employer’s option is de minimis or where the employer is constrained and very
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likely to remain so. When the benefit option is valuable and the period over which advance
recognition occurs is long, trust cannot provide sufficient motivation for employees’
acquiescence.
Benefit designs with substantial conditionality (long cliff vesting, revocable benefits,
shutdown benefits) may endanger employees (using accrued cost) or misinform shareholders
(using exit cost). This suggests that there may not be genuine agreement on terms. The explicit
contract often clearly retains rights for the employer while the implicit contract limits the
exercise of these rights.
If the implicit agreements are genuine, it should be possible to explain to employees and
shareholders alike why the contracts take the form that they do and how the existence of such
contracts is beneficial to the parties. Because these contracts create risk and raise expected labor
costs, proponents should be able to identify expected productivity gains and their source.
Arguments in re training, performance and severance, along the lines of Lazear, do just that.
Principle 3, however, limits the productivity gains that may be expected. It is reasonable
to argue that five-year cliff vesting in DB and DC plans can protect training investments. It is
less reasonable to argue that promising nonvested post-employment medical benefits to 25-yearold employees adds more in retention incentives than it costs in risk, reputation and
dissatisfaction.
In situations where, over extended periods, the exit promise is nonexistent and the
looming liability should be reported to shareholders, we must look critically at the benefit design.
Implicit contracts are inherently frail; the degree may be measured by the magnitude of the
ABO:VBO disparity. Designs that reduce the disparity are likely to be more robust and more
efficient.
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4.3

More Robust Benefit Designs
Let us consider several redesigns of post-employment medical benefits that reduce the

ABO:VBO disparity, reduce contract risks and the associated costs, and may still provide
efficient incentives:
•

Individual accounts for post-employment medical benefits may be implemented on a DC
or cash balance basis. Retention incentives may be fostered through modest class-year
vesting. At a specified age, where retention is no longer an employer goal, full vesting is
granted.

•

DB post-employment medical may be accrued (and vested) ratably over some portion of
the employee’s career; for example, 10% of the ultimate medical coverage may be earned
in each of the 10 years preceding early retirement eligibility. Such accrual (with de facto
pay debiting) may begin when the employee is old enough to value such benefits.

•

As discussed in Section 3, projected accounting creates implicit reserves owed to
employees whose pay has been debited in excess of their exit benefits. Plans could be
designed where that reserve is partially vested, along the lines of the PBO settle-up
discussed in Section 3.3.
The ABO:VBO conflict may be seen as a marker or symptom of frail benefit design.

When the marker is noted, economic justification for the design should be sought. The search for
justification may validate the design as robust, challenge it as frail or result in valuable redesign.
4.4

Other Frail Designs
The very long cliff vesting typically associated with post-employment medical benefits

makes it a poster-child for dubious design. We next review some other cases where the mix of
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explicit and implicit provisions may be marked frail because neither the VBO nor the ABO tell
the whole story.
4.4.1

Subsidized Early Retirement with Cliff Eligibility
How shall we analyze the implicit contracts surrounding eligibility for subsidized early

retirement? The traditional actuarial anticipation of entitlement that leads to a positive contract
reserve ( Rt ) in the years approaching eligibility “bonds” the employee to remain until eligible.
At the moment of eligibility, the increased vested benefit value will be large and may extinguish
the contract reserve; that is, the bond is released. Under the traditionally smooth cost methods, it
is likely that subsequent ∆Rt ’s are slightly positive. The combined effect is to hold the employee
in the years approaching eligibility for subsidized early retirement benefits and to encourage an
early exit thereafter (note how the positive pre-eligibility contract reserve encourages employees
to remain in anticipation of its release, while positive post-eligibility ∆Rt ’s encourage
retirement).
To the extent that traditional final-pay plan designs (without subsidized early retirement)
created too much incentive for employees to linger past their peak years of productivity, the early
retirement subsidy may be seen as a “bribe” to encourage departure. The invention of the “open
window plan” circa 1980 represents a more efficient form of bribe that has made the early
retirement subsidy obsolete. Some of the movement towards cash balance plans that began in
1985 has been attributed to their lack of embedded early retirement subsidies.11
As in the case of cliff vesting, it is likely that benefit design and traditional cost methods
have incented the behavior of employers and employees in the years approaching early
retirement eligibility. The invention of window and cash balance plans indicates that more
efficient and transparent tools may be used to accomplish similar purposes. If cash balance plans
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eliminate subsidies, the issue is mootthere is no cliff. When window plans are used to create an
explicit cliff, exit costing recognizes the cost of the bribe immediately, improving transparency and
timing relative to the current treatment.12

For the traditional plan, the use of exit costing would lead to higher direct pay prior to
eligibility and would fully charge for the benefit subsidy in the year that it occurs. This would
make the personal and pension wealth accumulation of the employee smoother, in a fashion
somewhat along the lines of that achieved by cash balance plans. Because the traditional pension
incentives apply to age cohorts, they are blunt instruments when used to discourage employment
as worker productivity declines. With exit costing and/or the removal of early retirement
subsidies, employers may find it necessary to evaluate productivity more precisely for each aging
employee. Window plans may still be used to motivate groups.
4.4.2

Revocable Benefit Promises
Another difficulty with cost attribution for retiree medical benefits is their revocability.

Companies almost always retain the right to modify or terminate these plans. We observe that
under exit costing, eliminating coverage for employees who have not reached their dates of first
eligibility has no direct financial impact on either the employees or the company, simply because
there is no VBO and no charge against employee compensation. Under FAS 106, however, the
service cost that has accumulated to the APBO13 has been charged, and employer revocation
appropriates employee wealth.
Terminating benefits for retired or active employees who have become eligible breaches
an implied contract, with potential legal exposure, employee relations problems and reputational
cost. Petertil (2003) tells us the cost of terminable benefits cannot be measured by methods that
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ignore the likelihood of benefit reduction or elimination. Clearly the company’s right to reduce
or terminate such benefits is a valuable option. Valuable options remain unexercised indefinitely
only if their consequences for the optionholder exceed the gains from exercise.
Exit costing for revocable benefits protects employees because it does not recognize
benefits until they are paid (pay-as-you-go was the common approach prior to FAS 106). Of
course it does not inform shareholders that any obligation exists until it is paid, at which point it
is too late to charge against the pay of the now-retired recipient. How should shareholders
understand payment of a benefit that was neither promised nor charged against the employee’s
wages? One possibility is that the payment constitutes a gratuity. A purely gratuitous payment by
a company violates its fiduciary responsibility to shareholders.
Suppose instead that the payment is designed to develop good will among present
employees. Perhaps that satisfies shareholders if they are getting equal or greater value from
existing employees. But is the company charging the current employees or getting better service
from them? If so, is it because today’s employees expect that they will get future benefits even
though no irrevocable promise is made? Shall we charge current employees for benefits paid to
the retirees and then also charge them because they have been lured into believing that future
benefits await them?
Whether a gratuity or a goodwill builder or a lure, revocable promises seem to be fraught
with opportunities for misunderstanding, mispricing and abuse. But it still may be possible for us
to interpret the revocable contract as genuine, but conditional. Perhaps it is just such a contract
that allows some companies to continue to pay revocable benefits today while others choose to
renege.
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Perhaps the true contract is a conditional promise to pay as long as all is well: as long as
medical costs do not soar, as long as the company prospers, as long as the company values its
goodwill with current employees more highly than it values the marginal dollar needed to meet
other needs. If such promises exist, it is possible to design an appropriate accrual system. Option
theory offers us some techniques to value a promise to pay up to $X of benefits as long as the
company stock is priced at $Y or higher.14 This suggests that rational, explicit and transparent
contracts might be made along these lines. It does not, however, imply that this is a very good
idea.
4.4.3

Past Service Benefits
In Section 3 we identified so-called past service benefits as an example of a delayed-

recognition scheme that invited opportunistic behavior by employees. We also cited Byrne’s
(1983) observation that such benefits are always awarded in exchange for future service despite
their “past service” appellation.
Past service benefits are often created at the inception of a DB plan, when career-average
and flat-dollar plan benefits are updated and, less frequently, in response to plan amendments
due to plan mergers, statutory and regulatory changes, etc. Under current accounting and funding
rules, even though new liabilities are often created in an instant, recognition is delayed over
extended future periods.
A weakness of this approach has already been noted: shareholder liabilities are increased
immediately while compensation reductions extend over time.15 Unless many employees leave
en masse16, however, this seems to be little cause for concern and not much of a demonstration
that this is an untenable approach to benefit design.
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But here is where exit costing can illuminate an alternative design that is demonstrably
more favorable to shareholders. The apparent disadvantage of exit costing when past service
benefits are created is that it creates an abrupt loss to shareholders. Using delayed-recognition
(amortization of the past service liability over future years) recognizes that future compensation
will be reduced for employees who remain, in a fashion consistent with Byrne’s analysis of the
exchange of past service benefits for future employee-generated value.
Now consider an alternative design that effects the “Byrne exchange” and, using exit
costing, produces the desired cost spreading. Instead of increasing the vested benefit immediately
while delaying the cost recognition, simply phase in the benefit improvement over the desired
period. Thus, the accounting accruals are smoothed because the benefit accrual is smoothed.
Employees who remain in service receive the same ultimate benefits as under the existing
approach. Employees who leave receive less. The future costs have really been matched to the
future productive service of today’s employees. The employee incentives have been more
sharply defined and the employer is able to retain greater control and flexibility with respect to
future employment levels and compensation.
4.4.4

Plant Shutdown Benefits
Plant shutdown benefits are extra pension payments made to old long-service employees

when a plant is shut down. These have been negotiated between unions seeking job security for
their members and rust-belt employers who cannot agree to keep unprofitable plants running to
the detriment of their shareholders. In theory, such benefits align the interests of employees and
shareholders; older employees earn “sweat equity” in the plant in which they work and are
rewarded when shareholder interests dictate that plant operations shall cease.
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Once negotiated, these benefits become part of the business calculations made by
employers. The decision whether or not to shutdown and when to do so is influenced by the
existence of shutdown benefits and by their eligibility provisions17. Plan actuaries frequently
choose not to include shutdown benefits in the course of ongoing funding valuations because the
shutdown event is binaryit occurs or not, and funding for a probability of shutdown will
always provide too much funding right up to the moment of shutdown, when it is then shown to
have provided too little.
Although shutdown benefits may have some economic justification and contractual force,
they present very real problems to actuaries and accountants attempting to provide useful
information to shareholders. These benefit designs incorporate some of the same mechanisms
(long cliff eligibility, employer volition, equity characteristics) that challenge the viability of
revocable postretirement medical plans.
5.

Moral Hazard: Historical Examples and Societal Reaction
We look at examples where moral hazard options have been exercised and at society’s

reaction.
5.1

Historic Examples
The explicit DB contract under ERISA is VBO-like. PBO-based recognitionwhich

reflects an implicit contract reservemust be justified by the existence of implicit contracts. As
postulated by Lazear, such implicit contracts rely on reputational costs to deter employers who
might be tempted to exploit advance-recognition accounting. Such exploitation can diminish
employee morale, increase turnover and cause recruiting difficulties. Occasionally, exploitation
leads to law suits.
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These costs are likely to inhibit all companies in good times and most companies even in
less favorable times. From time to time, however, companies will find that reneging gains exceed
reputational costs and will act accordingly. It is at just such times that employees will find that
they have surrendered real compensation for “a pocketful of mumbles, such are promises.”18 We
look at three cases where employers have exercised their explicit rights, disappointing employees
whose expectations were implicitly formed.
•

Cash Balance Conversions. During the 1990’s, sponsors of traditional pay-related DB
plans faced aging tenured populations, a need to attract young mobile workers, rising
liabilities under their traditional back-loaded DB plans and competition from younger
firms around the world. While some of these employers terminated their DB plans and
startedor strengthenedtheir DC plans, many were trapped by potential excise taxes
(Section 5.222 below) and elected to convert to cash balance plans. Both DC
replacements and cash balance conversions honor the explicit ABO liabilities but
disavow some or all of the FAS 87 implicit contract reserve.
Consistent with Balan (2003), employers who convert to cash balance plans appear to
have concluded that the workforce they need today is not interested in LSICs nor in how
long-tenure employees are treated. Naturally, the long-tenure employees are often furious
and ready to exert themselves fully to recover the final-pay benefits and early retirement
subsidies they feel they have earned. Most prominent among the companies that have
faced the backlash from their older employees is IBM, whose cash balance conversion in
1999 led to loud protests, much bad press and Congressional scrutiny. Having already
grandfathered those employees within five years of earliest retirement eligibility, IBM
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responded to this political and public relations furor by agreeing to grandfather
employees aged 40 and over who had at least 10 years of service.
•

Cutbacks and Rescission of Post-employment Medical Benefits. Most employers have
been cautious about medical benefit promises and have reserved the right to amend or
terminate such plans unilaterally for nonunion employees. Prior to the application of FAS
106 in 1993, these plans were often accounted for on a pay-as-you-go basis.19 The
adoption of FAS 106, rising medical costs and some of the same factors driving DB plan
terminations and cash balance conversions (aging populations, mobile young workers,
worldwide competition) have led employers to cut back postretirement medical plans.
Companies that have been most burdened have had the greatest incentive to cut back or
rescind. According to the Employee Benefit Research Institute (2001):
“As a result of FAS 106, some employers placed caps on what they were
willing to spend on retiree health benefits. Some added age and service
requirements, while others moved to some type of "defined contribution"
health benefit. Some completely dropped retiree health benefits for future
retirees, while others dropped benefits for current retirees, although this
has happened less frequently than the other changes”.
Such cutbacks reduce the APBO and may generate income for plan sponsors. Even
though the accrual of the APBO has been charged against employee pay in accordance
with implicit contract theory, there is usually no legal limit on the degree of cutback.
Reputational concerns are likely to have mitigated the extent of cutbacks. Singh (2001)
says:
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“ … critics have renewed charges that some companies are using FAS
106the standard that since 1993 has governed accounting for
postretirement health-care benefitsas part of a strategy to reduce retiree
medical coverage, then reflect the lower reserve amounts in operating
earnings” (p. 1).
•

Layoffs of Employees Approaching Eligibility for Shutdown Benefits. In 1977, the
Continental Can Company and the United Steelworkers negotiated supplemental pension
benefits that would be paid to eligible employees in the event of plant shutdown or longterm layoff (Section 4.44 above). The eligibility requirements were expressed in terms of
age and service, for example, age plus service of at least 65 and 20 years of service.20
Several lawsuits (for example, Gavalik v. Continental Can Co., 812 F.2d 834, 851-853
(3d Cir. 1987)) alleged that the company subsequently initiated and maintained a
computer-based system to identify employees who were approaching eligibility. Many
targeted employees were then laid off and the computer system acted as a line of defense
to prevent their recall. These lawsuits were consolidated in the Newark Federal District
Court (McLendon v. Continental Can Co., 908 F.2d 1171 (3d Cir. 1990)), which ruled in
May 1989 that the layoff program violated Section 510 of ERISA. In January 1991, under
orders from the court, the parties agreed to a $415 million settlement in favor of the
employees.

5.2 Societal Reaction: Bad Contracts/Accounting Invite Legislation, Regulation and Lawsuits
Society reacts when bad outcomes befall innocent peoplepolitical institutions act to
redress perceived injustices. Legislators legislate, regulators regulate and courts decide. Each of
these actions affects employers and employees in ways that cannot be predicted accurately.
Unintended consequences are almost certain.
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Because the legislators, regulators and judges (collectively, rule-makers) are motivated to
repair damage, they are inherently results-oriented. It is almost never their self-perceived
function to do science. The Manning and Segal (2002) presentation entitled “Stop the Insanity”
describes the unintended consequences that have arisen in the DB pension funding area in the
post-ERISA era.21 No U.S. pension actuary would argue that the multiple overlapping rules made
in this era represent the best that actuarial science has to offer. We may conclude that the best
way for us to reduce the frequency of bad outcomes and the unwelcome bad rules that follow is
to do our best science aforehand.
5.2.1 Here Comes the Judge
When an employer reneges on what employees understand to be benefit promises,
particularly where pay debits have preceded vesting, the parties may meet in court. Once in
court, at most one party can win and sometimes both lose.
In the Continental Can case, the Court found substantial evidence that the company had
acted in bad faith and had deliberately misled the employees. Continental had run afoul of
ERISA Section 510. Although Section 510 permits a company to make economically motivated
business decisions with respect to such issues as layoffs and plant closings, it may not take
actions that are motivated by the emerging value of pension benefits. Continental attorney and
former U.S. Attorney General Nicholas deB. Katzenbach said, "I don't know anything about
Continental. … Maybe they do all kinds of bad things. I don't know. ... But you cannot run a
company if you can't take these [pension] costs into account" (Beck 1991, p. 66).
One of the lessons of the Continental Can case is that calculated exploitation of
contractual opportunities may be offensive and can be redressed. In particular, reasonably
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formed expectations of the aggrieved parties are likely to be respected. When contract particulars
and the commonsense understanding of the parties are sharply at odds, courts may feel
compelled to rewrite the contract.
Although courts are a common venue for testing society’s attitude towards contractual
exploitation, regulators and legislators often take action too. This is particularly true when the
perceived exploitation is widely repeated. The cash balance brouhaha which led to congressional
hearings in and after 1999 is a case in point. Cash balance plan conversions credit employees
with an opening balance that is usually computed to be equal to the accrued benefit value. Midcareer employees who expected to ride up the sharply accelerating accrued benefit curve until it
caught up with the PBO were disappointed. Although they would express the issue very
differently, they wanted to know what had happened to the implicit contract reserve.
Companies were applying the terms of the explicit contract. Many companies believed
that they were being more generous. By grandfathering mid-to-late-career employees, they were
meeting the expectations of the implicit contract. Even those that did not grandfather such
employees were able to argue that any plan going forward offered more than they were explicitly
required to offer. The right to terminate the DB plan at any time had been retained by virtually
every company with respect to non-bargaining employees.
Employee advocates argued vigorously in favor of the implied projected benefit contract.
Karen Ferguson, executive director of the Pension Rights Center, testified:
“What is particularly shocking about this practice22 is that these benefits were
fully funded and the employers fully intended to pay themuntil they were
advised by their consultants that they could take advantage of a technical
maneuver that could save them millions of dollars in benefit payments, while also
boosting their companies’ bottom lines” (Ferguson 2001, p. 4).
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Without judging the intentions of the employers ourselves, we observe that Ferguson’s
argument is made more plausible by projected funding and expensing methods. Where she uses
the phrase “fully funded” in support of her argument23 regarding employer intent, she might have
said “that these benefits have been fully paid for.” To the extent that the PBO (and comparable
ERISA measures of liability) anticipates future salaries, subsidies and eligibilities, this argument
might be persuasive regardless of market vagaries.
“We also think there is a way that the reasonable benefit expectations of the
employees can be reconciled with employers’ interests in having the flexibility to
make prospective changes in their plans” (Ferguson 2001, p. 5, emphasis added).
In a competitive economy with voluntary private pension plans, is it reasonable to hold
companies responsible for employees’ expectations with respect to future pay raises? Certainly
we do not “vest” their future compensation increases or potential service. Nor do we account for
such future compensation and service, but we do account for their impact on future pension and
medical benefits. Actuarial methods and assumptions include expectations of future pay
increases, future service, future eligibility and, as noted elsewhere (Bader and Gold 2003), future
equity risk premiums. Should we be surprised that employee advocates imply that actuarial
expectations bolster employee expectations?
In December 2002, after lengthy study of the controversial practice of converting DB
plans to cash balance plans, the IRS proposed regulations affirming that employers could convert
as long as the successor cash balance plan protected the value of accrued benefitsvalued at
reasonable interest rates.
This is noteworthy because the IRS proposal amounted to a determination that—despite
the outrage of employees who felt they had been mistreated (Section 6.1 below)—the terms of
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the explicit DB contract prevailed and there was no obligation to provide anything more than the
benefit accrued to date. Although this tends to reinforce arguments in favor of exit costing, it
should also serve as a warning: Courts, legislators and regulators will not always reject implicit
contract theories.24 Actuaries and accountants should be cautious about financial recognition of
contracts that clients do not recognize as legally binding.
The dissonance between PBO accounting and VBO contracting may be settled by exitcost accounting or by lawsuits, legislation and regulation that will intermittently enforce PBOlike contracts.
5.2.2

Results-Oriented “Fixes”
Legislatures, regulators and courts have used a results-oriented approach to “fix”

perceived weaknesses in the U.S. pension system over the past 30 years. Let us look at the
contrast between our free-market folklore and our regulator reality, followed by the “ERISA
Game” and two ham-handed fixes thereunder, concluding with a grandfathering lesson we have
learned.
5.2.2.1 Free-Market Folklore, Regulatory Reality
Although the free-market ethos highly values the freedom for parties to enter into
contracts of their own design, the American sense of fair play is offended by contracts that invite
exploitation, even if such exploitation is occasional and incidental. The post-war employee
benefit history of the United States, reflecting the tension between free markets and fair play,
includes strictly voluntary employee benefit plans that are strictly regulated.
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As long as promises made become promises kept, the free-market and fair-play forces are
both satisfied. When promises are broken, however, we find that there can be substantial debate
about what went wrong and how to fix it. Shall we (society, through government) strengthen the
enforcement of promises? How shall we deal with ambiguous promises? Should we intervene in the
promise-making as well as in the promise-keeping? What incentives are created? How much pertinent
information is available to each of the contracting parties at inception and subsequently?

Because these simple questions do not have simple answers in a complex society, society
provides a complex regulatory environment teeming with societal agents and quasi-agents,
including: courts; legislatures; official regulators such as the Department of Labor, the IRS and
the SEC; quasi-official regulators such as the FASB, the Actuarial Standards Board and the
Actuarial Board for Counseling and Discipline; and professionals in public practice including
CPAs and EAs.
5.2.2.2 The ERISA Game
Bader and Gold (2003) say ERISA froze the developing pension actuarial science and
began an iterative game between sponsors and consulting actuaries on the one hand and rulemakers on the other. This is an unfortunate history for all parties because actuarial science had
accomplished much prior to ERISA and was still flexible and creative. The ERISA Game stifled
the advancement of pension science; all sides appeared to need results more than greater insight.
Actuaries are scientifically trained businesspeople and, thus, capable of both deep
understanding and the pursuit of favorable resultsbut not always simultaneously. We describe
ourselves as problem-solvers, and this fits our ability to do science and our ability to get
resultsbut the ERISA Game made us choose, and our client’s needs made us choose, and the
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political nature of the regulatory establishment made us choose. It appears that duty to our clients
led us to choose results as the first priority and science as the second. To rationalize the ERISA
Game and “Stop the Insanity”, we must return to the strength of our root science, enriched by
developments in financial economics over the last 30 years.
For now, we look at two examples where the results orientation of the rule-makers played
off of actuaries’ needs for results and led to two ERISA disasters: (1) the definition of current
liability [Internal Revenue Code Section 412(l)] and (2) the Metzenbaum reversion excise tax
[IRC Section 4980].
•

Current Liability. When Congress enacted ERISA, it adopted actuarial funding
techniques that had been designed to budget employer contributions and adapted these in
order to create its own minimum funding requirements. Because minimum funding is
society’s way of defining the collateral necessary to back up benefit promises, the science
to apply is that outlined by Bodie and Merton (1992) rather than the budget technology of
Trowbridge (1952). When, after nearly a decade of ERISA minimum funding, an Allis
Chalmers plan terminated with seven-digit assets and nine-digit liabilities, it highlighted
the lack of science in minimum funding rules. The PBGC, which bore the brunt of such
failures, lobbied successfully for funding rules based on plan assets and the current
liability.
Results-oriented legislators understood that IRC Section 412(l) would increase employee
securityCongress was not especially interested in the associated actuarial mechanics.
Results-oriented consulting actuaries knew that their clients did not want funding
standards that would produce volatile contributions, nor were the clients inclined to give
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up expected equity returns and reduce volatility via asset/liability matching. The resulting
measure of the current liability is a miserable compromise all but devoid of scientific
basis. IRC Section 412(l) contributes to the Manning-Segal “Insanity.”
•

Metzenbaum Reversion Excise Tax. ERISA protects the accrued benefits defined by
the explicit pension contract (plan). Funding and accounting rules recognize the projected
benefits of the implicit contract. The results of this “split-personality” are tested
frequently by employers, their consultants, the courts, the regulators and the Congress. In
the 1980’s, after projected benefit funding combined with the beginning of a great bull
market to produce assets often far in excess of the accrued benefit liability, many
employers chose to terminate their plans in order to capture the surplus assets. Some of
these transactions occurred in connection with corporate takeovers and restructurings that
often included employee layoffs.
Senator Howard Metzenbaum and his constituents in the highly unionized state of Ohio
were upset. The result was IRC Section 4980,25 which combined with the continued bull
market to “trap” surplus assets in many plans. This, in turn, contributed to the 1990’s test
of accrued versus projected liabilities, for example, cash balance plan conversions,
angering still more plan participants. IRC Section 4980 contributes to the Manning-Segal
“Insanity.”

5.2.3

Grandfather Lessons
Consider how one full cycle of the ERISA Game is played. An employer, party to an

implicit contract that it finds onerous, concludes that the reneging gains are high enough and the
reputational costs are low enough for it to capture a net gain.26 It reneges, thereby riling its
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employees and, in turn, rule-makers. Rule-makers, in response to public expressions of
dissatisfaction, act to prohibit future occurrences of this kind. But rule-makers are constrained by
ex post facto considerations that limit the extent to which the original action can be overturned;
thus, corrective rule-making usually applies only prospectively. Therefore, the originator, and in
all likelihood some early copycats, enjoy the benefits of reneging on unfavorable implicit
contracts while those who might have hesitated or deferred have missed their opportunity.
•

Lesson one: If it appears that violating an implicit contract will produce a net gain, act
early. Carpe diem.

•

Lesson two: Each implicit deferred compensation contract—in conjunction with advancerecognition accountingshould have to justify itself in light of the costs inflicted upon
society from time to time. Lessened reliance on implicit contracts in the employment
arena is likely to be a public good.

Conclusion
This paper started out to answer the question, “What method should be used to compute
the periodic cost of employee benefit programs that accumulate value over long periods of
employee service?” In particular, should the method anticipate future pay raises and benefit
eligibilities under plans/contracts that do not guaranty future employment, future compensation
and plan continuance? Broadly characterizing recognition methods that do anticipate as projected
benefit cost methods (e.g., FAS 87) and those methods that do not as exit-cost methods, we
conclude that exit-cost methods are more accurate, more transparent and less fraught with
opportunities for manipulation.
In the course of researching the attribution issue, we discovered that the dissonance
between explicit accrued benefit rights on the one hand, and implicit projected benefit contracts

44

embedded in accounting and funding rules on the other, defines much of the battleground upon
which society fights its pension and OPEB wars. Along the way, we concluded that certain plan
designs, herein characterized as “frail,” were apt to be economically inefficient. These designs
were particularly prone to create misunderstandings between employers and employees, thus
serving to widen society’s battleground.
Some of the societal discordand much of the actuarial angst associated with itmight
be alleviated by a better pension actuarial model, one more rooted in the science of financial
economics than in the day-to-day results-oriented efforts of pension actuaries to meet client
objectives while navigating regulatory minefields.
As prior literature has shown, projected methods applied to pay-related plans overcharge
the pay of younger shorter-service employees in exchange for sometimes dubious promises of
future overpayment. We argue that advance recognition of future benefit entitlements in excess
of those actually promised is dangerous. Absent coercive mechanisms, implicit contracts have
insufficient force to justify financial recognition. Nonetheless, real-life complications require
financial reports to inform shareholders of obligations that might reflect less-than-perfectly
formed contracts.
Yet we should be aware, as financial reporters and as benefit designers, that implicit
contracts and financial reports based on them may add deadweight costs. We can aim at a more
efficient system by making explicit as much of the employment relationship as is practicable and
by avoiding the creation of valuable options that only go unexercised because they are held in
check by frail mechanisms. When these mechanisms fail, the breach will often be filled by
courts, legislators and regulators.
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DB pension plans define an explicit accrual pattern whose financial value is precisely
measured by exit costing. Every other recognition method deviates from this pattern, relying
economically on an implicit contract to explain the difference ( Rt ≠ 0 ). All of the projected cost
methods reflect positive implicit contracts ( Rt > 0 ) that raise employee expectations. Enforcing
these dubious contracts adds system-wide cost in several ways:
•

The cost of regulation and the threat thereof, including the patchwork of regulation that
derives from imperfections in prior regulatory layers. When creative consulting actuaries
exploit these imperfections in order to help their clients win the ERISA Game, regulators
respond with a new layer of “Insanity.”

•

Capital costs associated with opaque financial reporting. When lenders and shareholders
fear pension plan surprises, corporations must offer higher rates of return to acquire
external capital.

•

Additional capital costs arise when investors suspect that managers may be building up
slush funds inside well-funded plans.

•

Because employees cannot be sure that their expectations will always be met, in a
competitive economy, their compensation must include a reneging-risk premium.
Companies that wish to avoid this premium may choose not to sponsor DB plans.

•

Whether or not their compensation has included such a premium, employees who feel
victimized when reneged upon will sue. Win or lose, this is costly.

•

Because the implicit contract raises employee expectations, management must anticipate
negative reaction whenever they contemplate plan cutbacks. Thus, the apparently flexible
implicit contract becomes an impediment to real flexibility in the future.
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In contrast, exit costing substantially immunizes employees so they do not bear the brunt
of plan design changes. This clarifies the employment contract, reducing dependency on
ambiguous implicit contracts, reduces the threat and cost of regulation, provides transparency to
investors and allows management greater flexibility to design plans that best serve the future
interests of all constituents.
If we wish to stop the regulatory insanity, employers must make explicit and rational
pension contracts with their employees. Exit costing follows a rational entitlement contract,
diminishes employee expectations and reduces the judgmental actuarial “art” that many of us
have enjoyed practicing. It represents something of a return to the “science” in pension actuarial
science. It encourages us to direct our creative talents to the development of explicit benefit
contracts incorporating transparent incentives.
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Appendix A
Notation Table
Notation

Definition

t
Lt ()
At
ABOt
ACt
Pt
PBOt
SCt
Vt
VBOt
VCt
TCt
Wt

Career year.
Liability valuation function, discounts, annuitizes and decrements as necessary.

= Lt ( At )
= Lt (∆At ) , accrued-benefit-based service cost (traditional unit credit normal cost).
Projected benefit, end of year t .

= Lt ( Pt )
= Lt (∆Pt ) , FAS 87 Service Cost (projected unit credit normal cost).
Vested benefit, end of year t .

= Lt (Vt )
= Lt (∆Vt ) , Exit Cost (service cost under exit-cost model)
Total compensation, end of year t .
Direct compensation, end of year t .

Wt = TCt − XCt , where XCt is recognized cost. Wt = TCt − VCt under exit-cost method.
An “implicit contract” reserve. Employer owes employee, Rt > 0 , or vice versa, Rt < 0 .
One year change in implicit reserve. Special case, FAS 87 vs. Exit Cost: ∆Rt = SCt − VCt

Rt
∆Rt
Wt

Accrued benefit, end of year t .

'

'

Special case, used in Appendix B. Wt = TCt − SCt = Wt + VCt − SCt = Wt − ∆Rt
'

TCt
x
T −t | ä x + t

'

'

Special case, effective total compensation: TCt = Wt + VCt = TCt − ∆Rt
Employee age at hire.
$1 deferred annuity, employee age x + t , commences at age x + T
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Appendix B
A defined lump sum payable on exit ( Vt ) is equal to 2 percent of final year’s notional total compensation (what Company A
pays, TC t ) for each year of service. Direct pay ( Wt ) is determined by subtracting recognized exit benefit cost, VCt . When SCt is
recognized (per FAS 87), alternate direct pay ( Wt ' ) is determined accordingly, and vested total compensation ( TC t ' ) is computed by
adding back VCt . The equivalences ∆Vt = VCt and ∆Pt = SC t are special cases due to assumed zero percent discount, service survival
certainty and the lump-sum benefit definition.
t

TC t

Wt

Vt

∆Vt = VCt

Pt

∆Pt = SC t

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

$50,000
52,448
55,016
57,710
60,536
63,500
66,609
69,871
73,292
76,881
80,645
84,594
88,736
93,081
97,638
102,419
107,434
112,694
118,212
124,000
130,072
136,441
143,122
150,129
157,480
165,191
173,280
181,764
190,664
200,000

$49,000
51,350
53,813
56,394
59,099
61,934
64,904
68,017
71,279
74,697
78,279
82,033
85,967
90,089
94,409
98,936
103,680
108,652
113,862
119,321
125,042
131,037
137,320
143,903
150,802
158,032
165,608
173,547
181,867
190,585

$1,000
2,098
3,301
4,617
6,054
7,620
9,325
11,179
13,193
15,376
17,742
20,302
23,071
26,063
29,291
32,774
36,528
40,570
44,921
49,600
54,630
60,034
65,836
72,062
78,740
85,899
93,571
101,788
110,585
120,000

$1,000
1,098
1,203
1,316
1,437
1,566
1,705
1,854
2,013
2,184
2,366
2,561
2,769
2,991
3,229
3,483
3,753
4,042
4,351
4,680
5,030
5,404
5,802
6,226
6,678
7,159
7,672
8,217
8,797
9,415

$4,000
8,000
12,000
16,000
20,000
24,000
28,000
32,000
36,000
40,000
44,000
48,000
52,000
56,000
60,000
64,000
68,000
72,000
76,000
80,000
84,000
88,000
92,000
96,000
100,000
104,000
108,000
112,000
116,000
120,000

$4,000
4,000
4,000
4,000
4,000
4,000
4,000
4,000
4,000
4,000
4,000
4,000
4,000
4,000
4,000
4,000
4,000
4,000
4,000
4,000
4,000
4,000
4,000
4,000
4,000
4,000
4,000
4,000
4,000
4,000

Σ 3,263,459

3,143,459

120,000

120,000

Wt

'

$46,000
48,448
51,016
53,710
56,536
59,500
62,609
65,871
69,292
72,881
76,645
80,594
84,736
89,081
93,638
98,419
103,434
108,694
114,212
120,000
126,072
132,441
139,122
146,129
153,480
161,191
169,280
177,764
186,664
196,000

TC t

'

$47,000
49,546
52,219
55,026
57,973
61,066
64,314
67,725
71,305
75,064
79,011
83,154
87,504
92,072
96,867
101,902
107,187
112,737
118,563
124,680
131,102
137,845
144,924
152,356
160,158
168,351
176,951
185,981
195,462
205,415

3,143,459 3,263,459

Rt

∆Rt

Vt / TCt

VCt / TCt

$3,000
5,902
8,699
11,383
13,946
16,380
18,675
20,821
22,807
24,624
26,258
27,698
28,929
29,937
30,709
31,226
31,472
31,430
31,079
30,400
29,370
27,966
26,164
23,938
21,260
18,101
14,429
10,212
5,415
0

$3,000
2,902
2,797
2,684
2,563
2,434
2,295
2,146
1,987
1,816
1,634
1,439
1,231
1,009
771
517
247
-42
-351
-680
-1,030
-1,404
-1,802
-2,226
-2,678
-3,159
-3,672
-4,217
-4,797
-5,415

2%
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
22
24
26
28
30
32
34
36
38
40
42
44
46
48
50
52
54
56
58
60

2.00%
2.09
2.19
2.28
2.37
2.47
2.56
2.65
2.75
2.84
2.93
3.03
3.12
3.21
3.31
3.40
3.49
3.59
3.68
3.77
3.87
3.96
4.05
4.15
4.24
4.33
4.43
4.52
4.61
4.71

0
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Endnotes
1

In many cases, for example, one party performs first, effectively becoming a creditor of the

other.
2

A “better” contract increases at least one party’s welfare at no cost to any other party.

3

The performance of such employees can neither be perfectly specified (as in an explicit

contract) nor costlessly monitored; thus, incentives that motivate employees are incorporated into
an efficient (but second best) contract. Although the same considerations might argue for implicit
contracts for senior executives, it appears that the cost-benefit ratio related to the specification of
executive contracts is generally more favorable than it is for salaried professionals and middle
managers.
4

The Canadian Institute of Chartered Accounts adopted CICA 3460 effective for 1987, and

added CICA 3461 in 2000. The Accounting Standards Board of the U.K. replaced Statement of
Standard Accounting Practice 24 (SSAP24) with Financial Reporting Standard 17 (FRS 17)
which they promulgated in 2000 to be in effect in 2003, postponed to 2005. The IASB’s
predecessor, the International Accounting Standards Committee, introduced International
Accounting Standard 19 (IAS 19) in 1999. Each standard uses projected costing for statements of
profit and loss.

5

See, especially, Byrne’s remark defending the practice of spreading the cost of immediate

increases in accrued promises over substantial future periods (i.e., delayed recognition):
“There is no basis for the view that an employer adopts a pension plan
primarily as a reward for services rendered prior to the adoption of the plan …
Pension funds represent reward for future service and productivity.
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“The same conclusion can be reached for amendments to a pension plan.
That a plan may use pre-adoption service or pay … does not detract from the
conclusion that the plan is an exchange for future service” (Byrne et al. 1983, p.
985).
We return to this subject in Section 4.43.
6

Recall that the VBO, as opposed to the ABO, ignores nonvested benefits and benefits for which

eligibility rules have not yet been satisfied. In the example at hand, the VBO equals the ABO.
7

Final-pay plans are invariably based on some measure of direct pay. The use of total

compensation in our example simplifies the illustration without significant distortion.
8

This is equivalent to zero percent discount rate and service survival probability of unity.

9

Two percent of $52,448 times two years. The entire tabulation appears in Appendix B.

10

Source: an anonymous reviewer of this paper.

11

“The study found that when companies reduced costs in the conversion it was largely due to

the prospective elimination of subsidies for early retirement, which typically augment benefits at
around age 55. The effect on normal retirement benefits was much more muted” (see Watson
Wyatt 2003). “Some companies may feel that these subsidies have become cumbersome,
expensive or unfair. Where that is the case, the introduction of a cash balance plan may present
an opportunity to eliminate or rethink these subsidies” (see Kwasha Lipton 1985, p. 6, original
emphasis).
12

Some might argue that the spreading of window costs over future periods to match anticipated

cost savings from the elimination of unproductive workers is good accounting. It is more likely
true that the losses that arise from continuing to employ these workers (under a contract theory
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that makes employers reluctant to terminate them) have already been incurred because the
“contract” assures that the losses will soon be realized. The window plan write-off recognizes
that cost immediately. If any spreading were really appropriate, it would be backward not
forward.
13

Because post-employment medical benefits are not pay-related, the accumulated

postretirement benefit obligation (APBO) under FAS 106 (FASB 1990) parallels both the ABO
and the PBO under FAS 87. The APBO accumulates uniformly from the employee’s date of hire
until his first eligibility date (e.g., at age 55). Throughout that period, the exit benefit is certainly
zero and may remain so forever because the firm maintains the right to revoke it.
14

Petertil (2003) characterizes these conditional promises as employee “equity interests.” Here

they are characterized as equity options.
15

A negative implicit contract reserve is created and amortized.

16

This situation may be created quite deliberately under a window plan.

17

Because the benefits were designed to protect old long-service employees, the eligibility cliffs

occur only with substantial age and service.
18

Paul Simon (1969) “The Boxer”

19

Because revocable benefits never vest, pay-as-you-go is exit costing.

20

At some plants, age plus service had to total 70 or 75.

21

Also see Gold (2003) for a brief follow-up to Manning and Segal (2002).

22

“… reducing the expected pension benefits of older employees” (emphasis added).

23

A convenient argument, given that the S&P 500 Index ended the year 2000 at 1320.28.

24

The IRS proposed rule has been promulgated during an administration generally deemed to be

corporate-friendly.
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25

Ten percent excise tax on asset reversions, IRC Section 4980, added by Pub. L. 99-514, title

XI, Sec. 1132(a), for reversions after Dec. 31, 1985. Increased to 15 percent by Pub. L. 100-647,
title VI, Sec. 6069(a), for reversions after Dec. 31, 1988. Increased to 20 percent by Pub. L. 101508, title, XII, Sec. 12001, which further provided a rate of 50 percent unless the employer used
at least 20 percent of the otherwise revertible assets to fund immediate benefit increases or at
least 25 percent to fund a qualified replacement plan, for reversions after Sept. 30, 1990.
26

Balan (2003) describes this in the context of a firm that no longer needs to recruit young

employees into LSICs.
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